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4PROJECT 
“EUROPEAN VALUES AND IDENTITY STUDIES”
Project Title: European Values and Identity Studies (587684-EPP-
1-2017-1-UA-EPPJMO-MODULE)
Timing of the Project: 01.09.2017 – 31.08.2020
Project Beneficiary: The National University of Ostroh Academy
Project objective and specific tasks:
– raise awareness of the target audience in the field of European 
values and identity Studies, of the EU and the EU-Ukraine relations, 
based on new teaching technologies and visions;
– initiate the active public debate on European values and identity 
policy at local, regional and national levels;
– involvement of the academic community, civil society, local 
authorities and the representatives of institutions, interested in the 
sustainable development of Ukraine, based on European values, that 
will ensure European standards of living and decent place of Ukraine 
in the world;
– coordination of partner cooperation in informing the society on 
European integration of Ukraine between authorities at the regional 
level, NGOs and other interested institutions.
Target group:
The project has 4 basic target audiences: students of NUOA; 
scientists and experts, members of interested institutions; government 
officials, practitioners from Ukraine and UE countries, NGOs members 
and Internet users.
Specific activities:
– 3 teaching course for Political Studies «East European Studies», 
Cultural Studies «European Cultural Studies», International Relations 
«EU Studies» students, who came from different sides of Ukraine;
5– book with project results, web site of this project, MOOC “What do 
we need to know about Europe and its values?”;
– 2 peer-reviewed articles, based on research made in this project;
– 2 international conferences, dedicated to the problem of cultural 
identity, European values and education, workshop for teachers, 
roundtable for representatives of public administration, NGO’s activists, 
students, academic staff, researchers.
Expected outcomes:
– enriching students interest in the topic of European values and 
identity studies and promotion of idea of a United Europe;
– getting an adequate level of information on the education of young 
people in a spirit of common European values, promoting partnerships 
with European youth NGOs, supporting Ukraine’s course toward 
integration into European structures. Increase of interest and mobility of 
young researchers in the European Union;
– creating new types of research assignments on MOOC or project 
web site, that include education and information component, archive 
materials about research, online platform for the knowledge exchange 
on the most pressing issues of the EU and European values and identity 
studies;
– carrying out of research activities on the themes about European 
Union, European values, and identity;
– learning to form leadership skills, ability to make responsible 
decisions, and gain experience in organizing information campaigns, 
spreading knowledge about European values and identity studies. To 
increase overall intellectual level by finding information, development 
of new printed and electronic sources in this topic, that relevant for 
graduates in their professional life.
6COURSE: 
“EUROPEAN IDENTITY POLITICS”
Topic 1: The study of cultural identity: multi-disciplinary field 
of research
Cultural anthropological approaches to cultural boundaries and 
cultural change. The underestimated strength of cultural identity 
between localising and globalising tendencies in the European Union. 
Local identity and historical memory of community. Relationships and 
interactions between culture and identity. It will embrace research into 
the roles of linguistic, social, political, psychological, and religious 
factors, taking account of historical context. 
Topic 2: Constructing identity in Europe
EU identity-building discourse. The challenges for European 
identity. Three conceptions of a European political identity: (1) Building 
a common «European fatherland»; (2) A «Europe of fatherlands»; 
(3) European constitutional patriotism. The paradox of identity 
politics. Nation-state identity. Citizens’ sense of «nationhood». State 
institutionalization of collective memories. Member-state identity in 
Europe. Member-state visions for Europe’s identity. Citizen’s EU 
identity. What does a European identity mean? 
Topic 3: Europe Undivided: issue of identity politics in European 
Union
European identity and the search for legitimacy. «Politics of 
recognition». Deep diversity versus constitutional patriotism. The 
impact of the new nationalism and identity politics on Cultural policy-
making in Europe and beyond. Identifying core values in current national 
identity policies and cultural policy-making. Concepts of identity – a 
new Council of Europe challenge? Does a European identity have to 
supplant the national ones? Can it supplement or transform these? How 
much of a transformation is necessary? Will a European identity be a 
novel, post-national type of identity? 
7Topic 4: European identity as political instrument and political 
vision
Sources and conditions of identity politics. Examining the political 
relevance of collective identity. Idea and identity of the nation. Political 
identity construction: nation-state building and regional integration 
contrasted. Difficulties and peculiarities of supranational community 
building. The historical-geographical and socio-political characteristics 
of Europe as a continent «multiple identity area» of overlapping 
territorial and historical spaces at local, regional and national territorial 
level. National identities and the idea of European Unity: myths and 
memories of the nation. 
Topic 5: Nationalism in contemporary Europe
Nationalism in Europe: historical aspects. The main concepts of rise 
of nationalism in Europe. The transformation of nationalism in post-
modern times. Nationalism reframed. The right-wing extremism in 
Europe. The nationalistic populism in Europe. Economic nationalism 
and development. 
Topic 6: Identity and migration in Europe: multidisciplinary 
perspectives
Identity and Cultural Diversity: Conceptual Entanglements. 
Toward a New Lexicon and a Conceptual Grammar to Understand 
the «Multicultural Issue». Negotiation of Identities and Negotiation of 
Values in Multicultural Societies. Identity and Marginalization: Migrants 
as the Other. The Self and the Other in Post-modern European Societies. 
Processes of Constructing and Deconstructing Gender Identities in 
Contemporary Migrations. Identity and Membership: Where to Belong. 
Identity and Symbols. 
Topic 7: Mapping Eastern Europe: imaginary and integration 
projects
Mapping Eastern Europe: political and cultural cartography. 
Imagining Eastern Europe: a discourse and narrative identity cases. 
The main geopolitical models of Central and Eastern Europe. Jerzy 
8Gedroyc’s conception of Central and Eastern Europe. Visegrad Group 
(Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary). Russia and Europe 
relations: historical and modern aspects. Ukraine and Intermarium 
project. 
Topic 8: Multicultural societies in Europe: the main models 
Multiculturalism as response to cultural diversity. The main 
conceptions of multiculturalism. Inclusive citizenship. The features of 
multicultural societies in Europe. Criticism of multiculturalism. The 
Failure of Multiculturalism? Alternative multicultural and multinational 
policies. 
Topic 9: Tolerance and value of Other
The philosophical conceptions of tolerance. Repressive tolerance. 
The issue of authentic tolerance. Tolerance as necessary element of 
modern societies. Tolerance as value of modern Europe. 
Topic 10: Image of the Enemy in Central and Eastern Europe
The Other as an enemy. Conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
Balkan conflict. Conflicts in post-soviet countries. Ukrainian-Russian 
conflict. Image of the enemy as propaganda issue. Stereotypes and 
discourse identity. 
Topic 11: Politics of memory and constructing European identity
Individual and collective memory. Collective memory and identity. 
Contestant histories and dialogue of memories. Memory and trauma in 
Europe. Politics of memory and Holocaust. The great famine in Ukraine 
and discourse of European collective memory. Memory, political change 
and EU’s integration. 
Topic 12: Religious identity. Dialogue between state and religion
Religious heritage in Europe: a brief introduction to historical 
context. The situation of religions in contemporary Europe. Religious 
institutions in European countries. Religious differences and ecumenism. 
Development of democratic values and religion. Religion and European 
9integration. Secularism and laicism in contemporary European countries. 
Religious education in school. 
Topic 13: The Islamic discourse in Europe
Islam in Europe: historical aspects. Islam in Europe: stats perception 
vs reality. Islam and its values. The Muslim population in contemporary 
European countries. Anti-Islam protest: causes and effects. Euro-Islam. 
Topic 14: “Cultural wars” and conflicts of values
Conflict of values. Religious wars in Europe. Conflicts in Europe 
in the 20th century. Two cultural wars in modern Europe: postmodern 
relativism vs. the defenders of traditional morality; cultural diversity vs. 
national monoculture. The danger of European cultural wars. Ways to 
overcome the conflicts of values. 
Topic 15: European Union cultural policy
Cultural policy as element of integration and growth of countries. 
European Agenda for Culture. EU Cultural Policy between Community-
building and Market-making. The culture sector as a source of job 
creation, contributing to growth in Europe. EU’s culture and media 
programmes.
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TEACHERS
Vitalii Lebediuk
Ph.D. in Public Administration, Associate Professor of the Department 
of Political Science, Dean of Faculty of Political Studies and Information 
Management at the National University of Ostroh Academy. 12 years 
of academic teaching experience. Title of thesis for Candidate’s degree 
(Ph.D.): Organizational development of political parties in Ukraine: 
optimization of state influence mechanism (February 10, 2012). Research 
interests: Comparative politics, European Studies, Political Parties and 
Party Systems, Election Systems and Voting Behaviour, Quantitative 
Research Methods, Transition in post-Communist Europe.
Dmytro Shevchuk
Doctor of science in field of philosophy, Associated Professor of 
Department of Culture Science and Philosophy at National University 
of Ostroh Academy. 14 years of academic teaching experience. Title of 
thesis for Doctor of Science’s degree: “The ontological dimensions of 
contemporary political world: a philosophical analysis” (April 28, 2015). 
Research interests: contemporary political philosophy, methodology of 
cultural studies, problems of identity, cultural and political processes in 
Central and Eastern Europe.
Olena Shershnova
Ph.D. in Public Administration, Senior Lecturer of Department of 
Document Science and Informational Activities at National University 
of Ostroh Academy. 14 years of academic teaching experience. Title 
of thesis for Candidate’s degree (Ph.D.): “The public administration’s 
mechanisms in the sphere of informational providing of tourism 
activities (on example of Rivne region)” (October 15, 2010). Research 
interests: information security in EU and Post-Soviet republics, 
sustainable development of local communities in UE and Ukraine, ICT 
for sustainable development, policy in local communities in UE and 
Ukraine, tragedy of the commons and its avoiding, problems of values 
in communities.
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READING TEXTS
Avraham Rot
Constructing Identity  
and Embracing Boredom in United Europe
Much intellectual and institutional effort is invested in the attempt at 
understanding and bridging the gap between the European Union and 
its citizens. Numerous studies and projects have been set up with this 
aim and dedicated to the task of discovering or defining the meaning of 
European identity in postwar and post-wall Europe. [1] The sought after 
identity should be strong enough to bring a sense of shared fate into 
European consciousness, motivate civic involvement and engagement 
in EU-level politics, nourish a vital European public sphere and 
reinforce Europe-wide solidarity. It should be strong enough to make 
up for the Union’s infamous democratic deficit, neutralize explosive 
national antagonisms and promote further integration in controversial 
policy fields, such as welfare, migration, security and foreign affairs, in 
order to alleviate internal socio-economic disparities, prevent “negative 
spillovers” from without the EU and for the EU to gain a say as a global 
power. Moreover, the possibility or actuality of such an identity has 
sparked off the imagination of many who believe that the EU heralds 
the emergence of an innovative, postmodern, post-Westphalian or even 
neo-medieval sort of political identity beyond the longstanding political 
order of nation states. [2] Much is at stake and much is written and 
said, yet reality seems to stagnate as far as it has to do with popular 
involvement and identification with politics at the European level. 
A stubborn obstacle separates European politics from its citizens. 
Straightforwardly put, this obstacle and much more which is essential 
and systematic to the European integration project can be encapsulated 
in the notion of boredom.
The EU-demos interface problem, or what is more commonly known 
as “the democratic deficit”, is often explained as a consequence of the 
Union’s highly complex, bureaucratized and detached institutional 
structure, technocratic staff, abstract iconography and faceless leaders, 
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which render politics at the European level inaccessible to the wider 
public. At a deeper level one can dig out the more systematic causes 
of the insipidness of European politics in the shape of the orientation 
toward compromise and consensus and the focus on the more technical 
and economic policy fields rather than on the political and controversial 
ones. The weakness of the European Parliament – the only institution 
of the EU which is directly elected by the citizens – in the decision 
making processes is, of course, another important contributor to the 
overall democratic deficit and popular disinterest. The many attempts 
at fostering an all-embracing European identity cannot evade the 
ultimate comparison to the national experience: Instead of the heavily 
fought-over geopolitical borders, charismatic leaders, racial hierarchies, 
national narratives and heroic histories, the citizens of Europe are 
presented with diffuse free-trade areas, rationalized administration, 
hackneyed universal values, worn out political slogans and fading, 
anti-heroic collective memories as sources for political orientation and 
identification. To discuss and analyse any one of these aspects of the 
democratic deficit would run the risk of producing research as tiresome 
as its subject. But if we call a spade a spade and name “boredom” as that 
which blocks the EU-demos interface, not only will we gain access to 
the core of the problem, which is initially and ultimately a problem of 
emotional involvement, but we will also be in a position to draw insights 
from the individual experience of boredom, the type of reflection it 
invites and its constant reevaluation in the overall context of the modern 
and postmodern conditions; these insights may enable us to better 
understand how such experience, reflection and reevaluation occur 
when it comes to collective and institutionalized confrontation with the 
vanity of ideology, futility of utopia, disenchantment of nostalgia and 
meaninglessness of self-identity.
At first glance the notion of boredom may be conceived both as too 
simplistic and too elusive and subjective for a theoretical examination of 
subtle and complex issues such as political identity and civic engagement. 
It is commonly from the mouths of children and adolescents that we 
hear the word ‘boring’ uttered, usually as a complaint addressed to the 
responsible adult around. Nagging my mother about feeling bored, I 
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used to get the reiterative reply: “It is OK honey; no one dies out of 
boredom.” Often too there is a childish or youthful air to grownups 
when they employ this word. Its attribution to a certain person, event or 
object would usually be meant as an unsophisticated and straightforward 
expression of disregard or poor opinion toward that thing. We are likely 
to find the word in the newspaper columns with regard to something 
which is supposed to supply entertainment (e.g. a play, film, novel, 
football match etc.) but falls short of delivering. With relation to 
politics, however, although it too is prone to accusations of boredom 
inducement, such charges seem to be essentially irrelevant since it is 
assumed that politics’ purpose is not to amuse or entertain; politics is a 
serious business.
Yet seriousness, in spite of the semantic proximity, does not 
necessarily imply boredom; political dramas have always drawn much 
popular attention, especially at crucial historical moments (as in times 
of war) but also in times of tranquility or even stagnation (then it would 
usually be in the shape of political scandals or gossip). Nor is boredom a 
matter to be offhandedly dismissed as unserious. Granted, no one dies as 
a direct consequence of boredom, but much irrational behavior, such as 
gambling, drug abuse, sexual abuse, murder and suicide is explainable 
in terms of boredom. [3] Boredom is often also understood as a cause 
for non-harmful or even positive irrational behavior, as in the case of 
behavior that seems nonsensical, extravagant or ridiculous, or activity 
we might call “artistic”. On top of the explanatory value commonly 
ascribed to boredom, it has much expressive value too: Through the 
notion of boredom we can articulate our discontent or uneasiness with 
something with which we fail to engage and which, therefore, appears 
to us as meaningless – whether it is a book, a lecture, a party, our 
relationship or our life. Much more can be said about boredom but for 
the moment this short illustration of the linguistic functions of the notion 
of boredom should already hint at the significance of its psychological 
and social functions (or rather dysfunctions).
Although often overlooked, boredom is surely a matter for serious 
consideration as it was indeed taken to be by profound thinkers such 
as Kierkegaard, Simmel, Benjamin and Heidegger – to mention but 
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a few. And in spite of the comparative marginality of the notion of 
boredom in theoretical discourse, a substantial amount of literature 
which is dedicated to its investigation on its psychological, sociological, 
philosophical, historical and aesthetic aspects has accumulated over the 
years. [4] Paradoxically enough, boredom appears to be everything but 
boring when it comes to reflecting over it and trying to understand it in 
depth. It unfolds as integral to the very foundations of the experience of 
modernity: secularism, urbanism, industrialism and technology. And, 
correspondingly, it shares a conceptual field with basic sociological 
notions such as alienation, anomie, automatization, standardization, 
bureaucratization and routinization. Yet none of these notions has the 
expressive value that boredom has. None of them is as prevalent in 
informal discourse and colloquially used to describe the frustration – 
but not only the frustration – that we experience in our daily encounters 
with the bars of the golden cages by which we are enclosed as students, 
employees, spouses, customers, artists, researchers or citizens. This is 
why boredom might have appeared as too simplistic or banal a notion 
to work with in the field of political identity at first glance. And this is 
partly why it is all the more powerful and worthy of closer examination.
As mentioned above, the word “boredom” is commonly employed 
in the context of complaining and criticizing. And indeed it supplies a 
reference point to much criticism of European politics: An article in the 
British, Eurosceptic newsletter Eurofacts, whose title reads “Boredom 
is the Europhiles’ Secret Weapon”, explains how the EU avoids critical 
examination and real public debates by maintaining itself in a “state of 
ennui”. [5] A post by a British blogger, entitled “The EU: Boring People 
into Servitude”, explains how “a cabal of unelected politicians siphon 
off powers from the sovereign states of europe [sic]” by breaking down 
policy goals “into 1000’s of individual regulations” thereby rendering 
“their day to day operations so monumentally tedius that it is hard with 
a casual glance for any european [sic] to see”. [6] In the context of the 
NO vote to the Lisbon Treaty in the first referendum in Ireland, political 
scientist Ivan Krastev has said that “European Union’s leaders’ strategy 
in dealing with crisis […] could […] be described as one of ‘evasion 
by trivialisation’”, and further explained that “European citizens are 
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bored to death with their leaders” and that this weakness is very much 
an outcome of the “very strength of the European project – its focus 
on piecemeal engineering and institutional reforms”. [7] According to 
these critics, boredom is not just an unfortunate byproduct of European 
politics; it is systematic and intentional; it has a political function which 
is undemocratic in essence.
By others, however, this very boredom is celebrated as a virtue rather 
than condemned as a manipulating mechanism. Historian Timothy 
Garton Ash, for instance, claims that, to a large extent, Europe being 
“nice, boring and irrelevant” is “a great achievement”. [8] European 
Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy, 
Margot Wallstroem, writes, on the occasion of Europe Day, an article 
entitled “So who says the EU is boring?”, in which she admits that not 
many people may be enthusiastic about this event or too much concerned 
about the EU altogether but that she, in fact, considers this situation as 
possibly the “greatest success” of the Union. Wallstroem further writes: 
“The EU doesn’t really do passion. If you tried to market the EU as an 
aphrodisiac, it would rate up there with a nice pair of socks. If anything, 
the EU flag stands for boring reason over passion [sic]”. [9] Likewise, 
European Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, has expressed 
his wish that, with the help of European involvement, the Balkans 
will become “normal, prosperous and boring”. [10] “B oredom”, so it 
appears, is by no means considered as a swear word by EU officials and 
other supporters of the integration project; it is a desirable state of affairs. 
Once again, we are confirmed that boredom is systematic to the EU, or 
as publicist Isolde Charim has incisively put it, “the European Union 
is a pathos-annihilating machine” (Pathosvernichtungsmaschine). [11]
But how are we to understand the Union’s ambition to foster a European 
identity when even the person in charge of its communication strategy 
so readily announces that, at bottom, all that can be communicated is 
sheer boredom. Or is boredom a part of the communication strategy 
itself? Do passion and reason stand in essential contrast when it comes 
to politics? And if this is indeed the case, what about the undemocratic 
nature of boring politics? Is an ideal-typical rational-legal authority 
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such as the EU bound to be emotionally detached from the public and, 
therefore, undemocratic in essence?
At this point a deeper look into the nature of boredom is instructive. 
In his lectures on the basic concepts of metaphysics delivered in the 
late 1920s, Heidegger has paid much attention to the ‘ground mood’ 
(Grundstimmung) of boredom (Langeweile). Several of his observations 
are highly relevant to our current investigation but for the moment we 
shall mention only one, namely that “boredom is at all possible because 
each thing […] has its own time”. [12] This observation stems closely 
from the Heideggerian morphological methodology and the fact that 
the German word for boredom, Langeweile, literally means a “long 
while”. Nevertheless it applies to the English case as well. For instance, 
we can also find this idea, that boredom is an outcome of some sort of 
rhythm discrepancy, in the writings of the American sociologist Orrin 
Klapp, who has dealt extensively with boredom in the context of the 
information society and explained it as a “lag in which the slow horse of 
meaning is unable to keep up with the fast horse of mere information”. 
[13] According to Giddens’ structuration theory, every individual is 
simultaneously “positioned” in two different durations: the duration of 
daily life and the “longue durée of institutions”. [14] Considering all 
this, we may conclude that boredom lurks in every encounter of the 
individual with institutions; it strikes when there is an attunement failure, 
i.e. when the individual-institutional temporal gap is not bridged over.
But what does it mean that each thing has its own time? And how 
can such temporal gaps be bridged? Generally speaking, we can say 
that not only institutions and individuals have different life spans and 
rhythms of change, but also celestial bodies, generations and public 
transportation systems. Having to wait for a train – which is Heidegger’s 
example of the first and least profound form of boredom – can be 
described as a synchronization procedure, in which the individual’s 
time merges with the time of the machine through empty and boring 
postponement. Likewise all other queuing and waiting in public space 
may also induce this feeling of impatience due to the interruption of 
the time flux of the self in its daily activity. These are all situational 
examples of temporal alignment. When it comes to the self and its life 
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as a unified whole, becoming synchronized with the social structures is 
a matter of the faculty that vouches for the diachronic consistency of 
the self, namely the faculty of memory. Institutions are custodians of 
social memory, which is encrypted in their sets of rules and laws and 
embodied in their structures through the events of history. The individual 
becomes attuned to these longer-wave frequencies of historical change 
by the means of processes which were conceptualized by the sociologist 
of time, Eviatar Zerubavel, as “mnemonic synchronization” and 
“mnemonic socialization”. [15] Through these processes, which take 
place in rituals, ceremonies, family gatherings, media events, museums, 
education systems and other apparatuses and mechanisms whereby 
societies generate and dissipate meaning, the individual becomes 
synchronized with the longue durée of institutions and becomes capable 
of imagining herself as part of a greater ‘we’ of which these institutions 
are representatives. Complementary to this temporally imagined, or 
collectively remembered, “we”, is, of course, the long lasting, still 
“alive and kicking”, spatially imagined communities of nation states. 
But geopolitics is never boring because it is basically synchronic and, as 
such, does not involve temporal discrepancies. Memory politics, on the 
other hand, is prone to frazzle and decay in meaning, since it is subject 
to entropy, the natural disintegrating effect of time.
As for the time being, the institutions of the European Union exhibit 
outstanding flexibility as far as it has to do with territorial demarcation. 
The Union’s modus operandi, so it seems, is biased towards inclusion 
and its legal structure is formed in a diffusible way. Its geopolitical 
representability is somewhat misleading since it is the Member State’s 
borders that are actually being represented. As Jacque Delors famously 
said, “the EU is an unidentifiable political object”. Indeed, the European 
integration project is not an entity: it is a process, and, as such, it is 
demarcated within time, not within space. The ultimate other of the 
Union is its history of war and disunity. [16] Thus, the importance of 
mnemonic socialization as a precondition for civic engagement with 
European politics becomes clear. The European Union is a monument of 
the Second World War; it is a site of memory, but it was not designed to 
be communicative of its history; it is fascinating as a historical reaction 
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and when posed against the longue durée historical background of 
Europe, but its time does not correspond with the time of daily life.
However, its extreme technocratic appearance, which is perceived 
as boring, is, paradoxically, the aesthetical interface through which 
the elusive meaning of post-national Europe can be grasped. Political 
boredom is the unavoidable outcome of conflict management 
mechanisms which operate in security communities such as the EU. Like 
insurance companies, they systematically eradicate contingency and 
colonize the future, rendering subjectivity and personhood, to a certain 
extent, meaningless. This difficulty of defining meaning is registered as 
boredom. But boredom (as opposed to ennui) is not a static condition; it 
is rather a drive that constantly pushes the individual toward innovative 
sources of meaning. [17] The fear of getting bored nourishes the 
entertainment industries which allegedly shift popular awareness and 
involvement away from politics. When private consumption exhausts 
its effectiveness, however, the meaninglessness of ephemerality (to 
paraphrase Hirschman’s “Shifting Involvements” thesis) brings us back 
to the public sphere where we give voice to our frustration with the 
golden cage of rationalized politics and try to channel collective action 
toward new horizons of meaningful engagement, such as the protection 
of the environment and remotely fought wars. [18]
Boredom is not the essence of being but, as it facilitates Heidegger’s 
investigation into the temporality of being-in-the-world, it allows us 
a glimpse into the temporality of being in society. Such existential 
terminology seems appropriate when we hear about projects with names 
such as “A Soul for Europe” being initiated in the European public 
sphere. [19] It also seems appropriate to accommodate the Habermasian 
vision of Europe establishing itself as distinguishably secular. As was 
acknowledged by existentialist thinkers, the individual’s experience of 
boredom is important in the constitution of the modern and secular self, 
which is devoid of transcendental solace. On a similar note we can say 
that a collective experience of boredom is essential for the constitution 
of postmodern society, which is deprived of the idols and ideologies of 
nationalism, authoritarianism and communism.
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Juliette Chevée
Constructing a European identity: yes, but how?
A few weeks ago on the occasion of the summit of the Heads 
of State on the budget negotiations Pascal Lamy acknowledged 
the difficulties in building a European identity. “Communities are 
forged on national warrior myths. The myth of the homeland is a 
nation in danger. The problem of Europe is that it was born on 
a contra-myth, peace”, explained the president of the WTO in a 
tribune in Le Monde dated 21st November 2012.
The problem presented by Pascal Lamy is not new. And yet, the 
projects to construct a civic and cultural Europe have multiplied, from 
the first cultural action plan launched by the European Commission in 
1977 to the widely spread Erasmus program.
But are these efforts really successful? In the French university 
system, the national average number of students coming back from an 
Erasmus year, reported to the size of their university, was 1% in 2008-
2009 (according to the Europe-Education-Formation-France agency). 
And a social mix of students enjoying this program is far from being 
achieved. The crisis is not helping for these poor results, as there is a 
threat of funds’ withdrawal.
The European identity, an artificial concept?
Facing such difficulties, the moment has come when it is legitimate 
to ask whether the encountered problems are due to the fact that there is 
no pre-existing European identity. The stories of ‘common heritage’ that 
are constantly hammered upon to try to prove somehow that a German 
has enough in common with a Greek in order to pull him out of the 
stagnation he is in are maybe only inventions? Creator myths put in place 
to consolidate and justify an economic union with a political union?
According to certain Europhiles, the seeds of the European Union 
existed already in the mind of Immanuel Kant. The debate on the 
candidature of Turkey continues to raise questions on the limits of Europe 
and this famous ‘common heritage’. But when thinking about it, is this 
artificial characteristic not common to any identity? Identity is never innate, 
26
it is constructed starting from some elements that a group of individuals 
consider as shared. This is demonstrated by the French identity: “Our 
ancestors, the Gaules…” was a common formula used in the history books 
of the Third Republic (and often even in the current books in a more subtle 
form), to teach the students the roots that bounded the French people. 
But this did not mean that much to students from the distant overseas 
territories to whom it was imposed without any distinction.
From the “school of the Republic” to the “school of Europe”
However, the ‘black hussars of the Republic’ have proved two things. 
First, a national identity, even if it tries to be based on historical facts, 
remains mainly a mental construct. Secondly, but this is quite evident, 
the school plays an important role in the acquisition of shared values on 
a large scale.
We want to construct a European identity? It has to go through 
school. Of course, you could argue, we are taught (a bit) about Europe at 
school. And our members endeavour to pass the message. But to create a 
real feeling of unity among Europeans, there has to be more of it.
A couple of weeks ago, one of our collaborators suggested to set 
up a YEE (Year of European Education). The principle is there, but 
the idea is without doubt a bit too ambitious: Although a part of the 
costs would be compensated by the fact that there would be ‘exchange 
between young people’, there would still be at least the cost of a plane 
or train ticket and not everybody can afford this. And, given the threats 
that already weigh on the Erasmus program, it is not certain that the EU 
is willing to finance such a project.
Besides, we should also consider that living a year abroad is not 
everyone’s dream. How would you manage to make Eurosceptics 
change their mind by pushing them to send their child to the other side 
of Europe, with strangers? The experience would be too brutal to be 
beneficial.
Finally, imagine the mess in the ministries if from one day to another, 
they would have to make a one year cut to school programmes in order 
to be able to send the students abroad!
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But we could possibly transform this idea in a sort of ‘European civic 
service’. During decades we have financed military services and the 
conscription still exists in some countries of the EU (Denmark, Austria, 
Finland). We could imagine on a similar model a mandatory period, not 
anymore at the service of a national army, but at the service of another 
European state. But the problem of costs would still exist.
A common programme for common values
A more timid idea, that already seems very ambitious to some, would 
be to establish some common school programmes, or at least to coordinate 
the ministries of education. Unifying the programmes in their entirety 
would obviously be too complicated, given that each reform of the French 
programme is prone to controversy. But why not replace the ‘classes of 
civic education’ (by the way, rather useless these days) by ‘classes of 
European civic education’? Certainly, it would be feasible to create a 
common class for all Europeans, which programme would be unified.
In an even less restrictive way, we could at first create a chapter that 
each state would commit to include in its programme (for example in 
France in the history-geography course), either during the last year of 
secondary education or during each year of high school. Preferably, this 
chapter should also be included in the programme of the “baccalauréat” 
(and of its European equivalents) in order to encourage students to 
become interested in it.
Not daring enough for someone, complicated to set up for others (but 
in the EU, everything is complicated), it would only be a droplet in what 
the students learn during the year, but at least it would be shared among 
young Europeans.
The construction of an identity is a matter of education. Education 
goes through school. The harmonization of what is taught at school is 
thus an obvious step towards the construction of a European identity.
Translated by Sarah Declercq
Published:
https://www.thenewfederalist.eu/Constructing-a-European-
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The manifesto of European patriots  
Fight for Europe – or the wreckers will destroy it
The idea of Europe is in peril.
From all sides there are criticisms, insults and desertions from the 
cause.
“Enough of ‘building Europe’!” is the cry. Let’s reconnect instead 
with our “national soul”! Let’s rediscover our “lost identity”! This is the 
agenda shared by the populist forces washing over the continent. Never 
mind that abstractions such as “soul” and “identity” often exist only in 
the imagination of demagogues.
Europe is being attacked by false prophets who are drunk on 
resentment, and delirious at their opportunity to seize the limelight. It 
has been abandoned by the two great allies who in the previous century 
twice saved it from suicide; one across the Channel and the other across 
the Atlantic. The continent is vulnerable to the increasingly brazen 
meddling by the occupant of the Kremlin. Europe as an idea is falling 
apart before our eyes.
This is the noxious climate in which Europe’s parliamentary elections 
will take place in May. Unless something changes; unless something 
comes along to turn back the rising, swelling, insistent tide; unless a 
new spirit of resistance emerges, these elections promise to be the most 
calamitous that we have known. They will give a victory to the wreckers. 
For those who still believe in the legacy of Erasmus, Dante, Goethe and 
Comenius there will be only ignominious defeat. A politics of disdain for 
intelligence and culture will have triumphed. There will be explosions 
of xenophobia and antisemitism. Disaster will have befallen us.
We, the undersigned, are among those who refuse to resign themselves 
to this looming catastrophe.
We count ourselves among the European patriots (a group more 
numerous than is commonly thought, but that is often too quiet and 
too resigned), who understand what is at stake here. Three-quarters of 
a century after the defeat of fascism and 30 years after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall there is a new battle for civilisation.
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Our faith is in the great idea that we inherited, which we believe to 
have been the one force powerful enough to lift Europe’s peoples above 
themselves and their warring past. We believe it remains the one force 
today virtuous enough to ward off the new signs of totalitarianism that 
drag in their wake the old miseries of the dark ages. What is at stake 
forbids us from giving up.
Hence this invitation to join in a new surge.
Hence this appeal to action on the eve of an election that we refuse to 
abandon to the gravediggers of the European idea.
Hence this exhortation to carry once more the torch of a Europe that, 
despite its mistakes, its lapses, and its occasional acts of cowardice, 
remains a beacon for every free man and woman on the planet.
Our generation got it wrong. Like Garibaldi’s followers in the 19th 
century, who repeated, like a mantra, “Italia se farà da sè” (Italy will 
make herself by herself), we believed that the continent would come 
together on its own, without our needing to fight for it, or to work for it. 
This, we told ourselves, was “the direction of history”.
We must make a clean break with that old conviction. We don’t have 
a choice. We must now fight for the idea of Europe or see it perish 
beneath the waves of populism.
In response to the nationalist and identitarian onslaught, we must 
rediscover the spirit of activism or accept that resentment and hatred will 
surround and submerge us. Urgently, we need to sound the alarm against 
these arsonists of soul and spirit who, from Paris to Rome, with stops 
along the way in Barcelona, Budapest, Dresden, Vienna and Warsaw, 
want to make a bonfire of our freedoms.
In this strange defeat of “Europe” that looms on the horizon; this 
new crisis of the European conscience that promises to tear down 
everything that made our societies great, honourable, and prosperous, 
there is a challenge greater than any since the 1930s: a challenge to 
liberal democracy and its values.
Other signatories: Vassilis Alexakis (Athens), Svetlana Alexievich 
(Minsk), Anne Applebaum (Warsaw), Jens Christian Grøndahl 
(Copenhagen), David Grossman (Jerusalem), Ágnes Heller (Budapest), 
Ismaïl Kadaré (Tirana), György Konrád (Debrecen), António Lobo 
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Antunes (Lisbon), Claudio Magris (Trieste), Ian McEwan (London), 
Adam Michnik (Warsaw), Herta Müller (Berlin), Ludmila Oulitskaïa 
(Moscow), Rob Riemen (Amsterdam), Fernando Savater (San Sebastián), 
Roberto Saviano (Naples), Eugenio Scalfari (Rome), Simon Schama 
(London), Peter Schneider (Berlin), Abdulah Sidran (Sarajevo), Leïla 
Slimani (Paris), Colm Tóibín (Dublin), Mario Vargas Llosa (Madrid), 
Adam Zagajewski (Cracow)
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Francis Fukuyama
Against Identity Politics
BEGINNING A FEW DECADES AGO, WORLD POLITICS 
STARTED TO EXPERIENCE A DRAMATIC TRANSFORMATION. 
From the early 1970s to the first decade of this century, the number of 
electoral democracies increased from about 35 to more than 110. Over 
the same period, the world’s output of goods and services quadrupled, 
and growth extended to virtually every region of the world. The 
proportion of people living in extreme poverty plummeted, dropping 
from 42 percent of the global population in 1993 to 18 percent in 2008.
But not everyone benefited from these changes. In many countries, 
and particularly in developed democracies, economic inequality 
increased dramatically, as the benefits of growth flowed primarily to the 
wealthy and well-educated. The increasing volume of goods, money, and 
people moving from one place to another brought disruptive changes. 
In developing countries, villagers who previously had no electricity 
suddenly found themselves living in large cities, watching TV, and 
connecting to the Internet on their mobile phones. Huge new middle 
classes arose in China and India – but the work they did replaced the 
work that had been done by older middle classes in the developed world. 
Manufacturing moved steadily from the United States and Europe to East 
Asia and other regions with low labor costs. At the same time, men were 
being displaced by women in a labor market increasingly dominated by 
service industries, and low-skilled workers found themselves replaced 
by smart machines.
Ultimately, these changes slowed the movement toward an 
increasingly open and liberal world order, which began to falter and 
soon reversed. The final blows were the global financial crisis of 2007–8 
and the euro crisis that began in 2009. In both cases, policies crafted 
by elites produced huge recessions, high unemployment, and falling 
incomes for millions of ordinary workers. Since the United States and 
the EU were the leading exemplars of liberal democracy, these crises 
damaged the reputation of that system as a whole.
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Indeed, in recent years, the number of democracies has fallen, and 
democracy has retreated in virtually all regions of the world. At the 
same time, many authoritarian countries, led by China and Russia, 
have become much more assertive. Some countries that had seemed 
to be successful liberal democracies during the 1990s – including 
Hungary, Poland, Thailand, and Turkey – have slid backward toward 
authoritarianism. The Arab revolts of 2010–11 disrupted dictatorships 
throughout the Middle East but yielded little in terms of democratization: 
in their wake, despotic regimes held on to power, and civil wars racked 
Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. More surprising and perhaps even more 
significant was the success of populist nationalism in elections held in 
2016 by two of the world’s most durable liberal democracies: the United 
Kingdom, where voters chose to leave the EU, and the United States, 
where Donald Trump scored a shocking electoral upset in the race for 
president.
All these developments relate in some way to the economic and 
technological shifts of globalization. But they are also rooted in a 
different phenomenon: the rise of identity politics. For the most part, 
twentieth-century politics was defined by economic issues. On the left, 
politics centered on workers, trade unions, social welfare programs, and 
redistributive policies. The right, by contrast, was primarily interested 
in reducing the size of government and promoting the private sector. 
Politics today, however, is defined less by economic or ideological 
concerns than by questions of identity. Now, in many democracies, 
the left focuses less on creating broad economic equality and more on 
promoting the interests of a wide variety of marginalized groups, such as 
ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, women, and LGBT people. 
The right, meanwhile, has redefined its core mission as the patriotic 
protection of traditional national identity, which is often explicitly 
connected to race, ethnicity, or religion.
Identity politics has become a master concept that explains much of 
what is going on in global affairs.
This shift overturns a long tradition, dating back at least as far as Karl 
Marx, of viewing political struggles as a reflection of economic conflicts. 
But important as material self-interest is, human beings are motivated 
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by other things as well, forces that better explain the present day. All 
over the world, political leaders have mobilized followers around the 
idea that their dignity has been affronted and must be restored.
Of course, in authoritarian countries, such appeals are old hat. 
Russian President Vladimir Putin has talked about the “tragedy” of the 
Soviet Union’s collapse and has excoriated the United States and Europe 
for taking advantage of Russia’s weakness during the 1990s to expand 
NATO. Chinese President Xi Jinping alludes to his country’s “century 
of humiliation,” a period of foreign domination that began in 1839.
But resentment over indignities has become a powerful force in 
democratic countries, too. The Black Lives Matter movement sprang 
from a series of well-publicized police killings of African Americans 
and forced the rest of the world to pay attention to the victims of police 
brutality. On college campuses and in offices around the United States, 
women seethed over a seeming epidemic of sexual harassment and 
assault and concluded that their male peers simply did not see them as 
equals. The rights of transgender people, who had previously not been 
widely recognized as distinct targets of discrimination, became a cause 
célèbre. And many of those who voted for Trump yearned for a better 
time in the past, when they believed their place in their own society had 
been more secure.
Again and again, groups have come to believe that their identities – 
whether national, religious, ethnic, sexual, gender, or otherwise – are 
not receiving adequate recognition. Identity politics is no longer a minor 
phenomenon, playing out only in the rarified confines of university 
campuses or providing a backdrop to low-stakes skirmishes in “culture 
wars” promoted by the mass media. Instead, identity politics has become 
a master concept that explains much of what is going on in global affairs.
That leaves modern liberal democracies facing an important challenge. 
Globalization has brought rapid economic and social change and made 
these societies far more diverse, creating demands for recognition on 
the part of groups that were once invisible to mainstream society. These 
demands have led to a backlash among other groups, which are feeling 
a loss of status and a sense of displacement. Democratic societies are 
fracturing into segments based on ever-narrower identities, threatening 
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the possibility of deliberation and collective action by society as a whole. 
This is a road that leads only to state breakdown and, ultimately, failure. 
Unless such liberal democracies can work their way back to more 
universal understandings of human dignity, they will doom themselves 
– and the world – to continuing conflict.
THE THIRD PART OF THE SOUL
Most economists assume that human beings are motivated by the 
desire for material resources or goods. This conception of human 
behavior has deep roots in Western political thought and forms the 
basis of most contemporary social science. But it leaves out a factor 
that classical philosophers realized was crucially important: the craving 
for dignity. Socrates believed that such a need formed an integral “third 
part” of the human soul, one that coexisted with a “desiring part” and a 
“calculating part.” In Plato’s Republic, he termed this the thymos, which 
English translations render poorly as “spirit.”
In politics, thymos is expressed in two forms. The first is what I call 
“megalothymia”: a desire to be recognized as superior. Pre-democratic 
societies rested on hierarchies, and their belief in the inherent superiority 
of a certain class of people – nobles, aristocrats, royals – was fundamental 
to social order. The problem with megalothymia is that for every person 
recognized as superior, far more people are seen as inferior and receive 
no public recognition of their human worth. A powerful feeling of 
resentment arises when one is disrespected. And an equally powerful 
feeling – what I call “isothymia” – makes people want to be seen as just 
as good as everyone else.
The rise of modern democracy is the story of isothymia’s triumph 
over megalothymia: societies that recognized the rights of only a small 
number of elites were replaced by ones that recognized everyone as 
inherently equal. During the twentieth century, societies stratified by 
class began to acknowledge the rights of ordinary people, and nations 
that had been colonized sought independence. The great struggles in 
U.S. political history over slavery and segregation, workers’ rights, and 
women’s equality were driven by demands that the political system 
expand the circle of individuals it recognized as full human beings.
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But in liberal democracies, equality under the law does not result in 
economic or social equality. Discrimination continues to exist against a 
wide variety of groups, and market economies produce large inequalities 
of outcome. Despite their overall wealth, the United States and other 
developed countries have seen income inequality increase dramatically 
over the past 30 years. Significant parts of their populations have 
suffered from stagnant incomes, and certain segments of society have 
experienced downward social mobility.
Perceived threats to one’s economic status may help explain the rise 
of populist nationalism in the United States and elsewhere. The American 
working class, defined as people with a high school education or less, 
has not been doing well in recent decades. This is reflected not just in 
stagnant or declining incomes and job losses but in social breakdown, as 
well. For African Americans, this process began in the 1970s, decades 
after the Great Migration, when blacks moved to such cities as Chicago, 
Detroit, and New York, where many of them found employment in the 
meatpacking, steel, or auto industry. As these sectors declined and men 
began to lose jobs through deindustrialization, a series of social ills 
followed, including rising crime rates, a crack cocaine epidemic, and 
a deterioration of family life, which helped transmit poverty from one 
generation to the next.
Over the past decade, a similar kind of social decline has spread to 
the white working class. An opioid epidemic has hollowed out white, 
rural working-class communities all over the United States; in 2016, 
heavy drug use led to more than 60,000 overdose deaths, about twice 
the number of deaths from traffic accidents each year in the country. 
Life expectancy for white American men fell between 2013 and 2014, a 
highly unusual occurrence in a developed country. And the proportion 
of white working-class children growing up in single-parent families 
rose from 22 percent in 2000 to 36 percent in 2017.
But perhaps one of the great drivers of the new nationalism that 
sent Trump to the White House (and drove the United Kingdom to vote 
to leave the EU) has been the perception of invisibility. The resentful 
citizens fearing the loss of their middle-class status point an accusatory 
finger upward to the elites, who they believe do not see them, but also 
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downward toward the poor, who they feel are unfairly favored. Economic 
distress is often perceived by individuals more as a loss of identity than 
as a loss of resources. Hard work should confer dignity on an individual. 
But many white working-class Americans feel that their dignity is not 
recognized and that the government gives undue advantages to people 
who are not willing to play by the rules.
This link between income and status helps explain why nationalist 
or religiously conservative appeals have proved more effective than 
traditional left-wing ones based on economic class. Nationalists tell the 
disaffected that they have always been core members of a great nation 
and that foreigners, immigrants, and elites have been conspiring to hold 
them down. “Your country is no longer your own,” they say, “and you 
are not respected in your own land.” The religious right tells a similar 
story: “You are a member of a great community of believers that has been 
betrayed by nonbelievers; this betrayal has led to your impoverishment 
and is a crime against God.”
The prevalence of such narratives is why immigration has become 
such a contentious issue in so many countries. Like trade, immigration 
boosts overall GDP, but it does not benefit all groups within a society. 
Almost always, ethnic majorities view it as a threat to their cultural 
identity, especially when cross-border flows of people are as massive as 
they have been in recent decades.
Yet anger over immigration alone cannot explain why the nationalist 
right has in recent years captured voters who used to support parties 
of the left, in both the United States and Europe. The rightward drift 
also reflects the failure of contemporary left-leaning parties to speak 
to people whose relative status has fallen as a result of globalization 
and technological change. In past eras, progressives appealed to a 
shared experience of exploitation and resentment of rich capitalists: 
“Workers of the world, unite!” In the United States, working-class 
voters overwhelmingly supported the Democratic Party from the New 
Deal, in the 1930s, up until the rise of Ronald Reagan, in the 1980s. And 
European social democracy was built on a foundation of trade unionism 
and working-class solidarity.
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But during the era of globalization, most left-wing parties shifted their 
strategy. Rather than build solidarity around large collectivities such as 
the working class or the economically exploited, they began to focus on 
ever-smaller groups that found themselves marginalized in specific and 
unique ways. The principle of universal and equal recognition mutated 
into calls for special recognition. Over time, this phenomenon migrated 
from the left to the right.
THE TRIUMPH OF IDENTITY
In the 1960s, powerful new social movements emerged across the 
world’s developed liberal democracies. Civil rights activists in the 
United States demanded that the country fulfill the promise of equality 
made in the Declaration of Independence and written into the U.S. 
Constitution after the Civil War. This was soon followed by the feminist 
movement, which similarly sought equal treatment for women, a cause 
that both stimulated and was shaped by a massive influx of women into 
the labor market. A parallel social revolution shattered traditional norms 
regarding sexuality and the family, and the environmental movement 
reshaped attitudes toward nature. Subsequent years would see new 
movements promoting the rights of the disabled, Native Americans, 
immigrants, gay men and women, and, eventually, transgender people. 
But even when laws changed to provide more opportunities and stronger 
legal protections to the marginalized, groups continued to differ from 
one another in their behavior, performance, wealth, traditions, and 
customs; bias and bigotry remained commonplace among individuals; 
and minorities continued to cope with the burdens of discrimination, 
prejudice, disrespect, and invisibility.
This presented each marginalized group with a choice: it could 
demand that society treat its members the same way it treated the 
members of dominant groups, or it could assert a separate identity for its 
members and demand respect for them as different from the mainstream 
society. Over time, the latter strategy tended to win out: the early civil 
rights movement of Martin Luther King, Jr., demanded that American 
society treat black people the way it treated white people. By the end of 
the 1960s, however, groups such as the Black Panthers and the Nation 
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of Islam emerged and argued that black people had their own traditions 
and consciousness; in their view, black people needed to take pride in 
themselves for who they were and not heed what the broader society 
wanted them to be. The authentic inner selves of black Americans were 
not the same as those of white people, they argued; they were shaped 
by the unique experience of growing up black in a hostile society 
dominated by whites. That experience was defined by violence, racism, 
and denigration and could not be appreciated by people who grew up in 
different circumstances.
Multiculturalism has become a vision of a society fragmented into 
many small groups with distinct experiences.
These themes have been taken up in today’s Black Lives Matter 
movement, which began with demands for justice for individual victims 
of police violence but soon broadened into an effort to make people 
more aware of the nature of day-to-day existence for black Americans. 
Writers such as Ta-Nehisi Coates have connected contemporary police 
violence against African Americans to the long history of slavery and 
lynching. In the view of Coates and others, this history constitutes part 
of an unbridgeable gulf of understanding between blacks and whites.
A similar evolution occurred within the feminist movement. The 
demands of the mainstream movement were focused on equal treatment 
for women in employment, education, the courts, and so on. But from 
the beginning, an important strand of feminist thought proposed that 
the consciousness and life experiences of women were fundamentally 
different from those of men and that the movement’s aim should not be 
to simply facilitate women’s behaving and thinking like men.
Other movements soon seized on the importance of lived experience 
to their struggles. Marginalized groups increasingly demanded not only 
that laws and institutions treat them as equal to dominant groups but 
also that the broader society recognize and even celebrate the intrinsic 
differences that set them apart. The term “multiculturalism” – originally 
merely referring to a quality of diverse societies – became a label for 
a political program that valued each separate culture and each lived 
experience equally, at times by drawing special attention to those that had 
been invisible or undervalued in the past. This kind of multiculturalism at 
39
first was about large cultural groups, such as French-speaking Canadians, 
or Muslim immigrants, or African Americans. But soon it became 
a vision of a society fragmented into many small groups with distinct 
experiences, as well as groups defined by the intersection of different 
forms of discrimination, such as women of color, whose lives could not 
be understood through the lens of either race or gender alone.
The left began to embrace multiculturalism just as it was becoming 
harder to craft policies that would bring about large-scale socio-economic 
change. By the 1980s, progressive groups throughout the developed 
world were facing an existential crisis. The far left had been defined 
for the first half of the century by the ideals of revolutionary Marxism 
and its vision of radical egalitarianism. The social democratic left had 
a different agenda: it accepted liberal democracy but sought to expand 
the welfare state to cover more people with more social protections. But 
both Marxists and social democrats hoped to increase socioeconomic 
equality through the use of state power, by expanding access to social 
services to all citizens and by redistributing wealth.
As the twentieth century drew to a close, the limits of this strategy 
became clear. Marxists had to confront the fact that communist societies 
in China and the Soviet Union had turned into grotesque and oppressive 
dictatorships. At the same time, the working class in most industrialized 
democracies had grown richer and had begun to merge with the middle 
class. Communist revolution and the abolition of private property fell 
off the agenda. The social democratic left also reached a dead end when 
its goal of an ever-expanding welfare state bumped into the reality of 
fiscal constraints during the turbulent 1970s. Governments responded by 
printing money, leading to inflation and financial crises. Redistributive 
programs were creating perverse incentives that discouraged work, 
savings, and entrepreneurship, which in turn shrank the overall economic 
pie. Inequality remained deeply entrenched, despite ambitious efforts 
to eradicate it, such as U.S. President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society 
initiatives. With China’s shift toward a market economy after 1978 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Marxist left largely 
fell apart, and the social democrats were left to make their peace with 
capitalism.
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The left’s diminished ambitions for large-scale socioeconomic reform 
converged with its embrace of identity politics and multiculturalism 
in the final decades of the twentieth century. The left continued to be 
defined by its passion for equality – by isothymia – but its agenda shifted 
from the earlier emphasis on the working class to the demands of an 
ever-widening circle of marginalized minorities. Many activists came to 
see the old working class and their trade unions as a privileged stratum 
that demonstrated little sympathy for the plight of immigrants and racial 
minorities. They sought to expand the rights of a growing list of groups 
rather than improve the economic conditions of individuals. In the 
process, the old working class was left behind.
FROM LEFT TO RIGHT
The left’s embrace of identity politics was both understandable 
and necessary. The lived experiences of distinct identity groups differ, 
and they often need to be addressed in ways specific to those groups. 
Outsiders often fail to perceive the harm they are doing by their actions, 
as many men realized in the wake of the #MeToo movement’s revelations 
regarding sexual harassment and sexual assault. Identity politics aims to 
change culture and behavior in ways that have real material benefits for 
many people.
By turning a spotlight on narrower experiences of injustice, identity 
politics has brought about welcome changes in cultural norms and has 
produced concrete public policies that have helped many people. The 
Black Lives Matter movement has made police departments across the 
United States much more conscious of the way they treat minorities, 
even though police abuse still persists. The #MeToo movement has 
broadened popular understanding of sexual assault and has opened an 
important discussion of the inadequacies of existing criminal law in 
dealing with it. Its most important consequence is probably the change 
it has already wrought in the way that women and men interact in 
workplaces.
So there is nothing wrong with identity politics as such; it is a natural 
and inevitable response to injustice. But the tendency of identity politics 
to focus on cultural issues has diverted energy and attention away from 
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serious thinking on the part of progressives about how to reverse the 
30-year trend in most liberal democracies toward greater socioeconomic 
inequality. It is easier to argue over cultural issues than it is to change 
policies, easier to include female and minority authors in college 
curricula than to increase the incomes and expand the opportunities of 
women and minorities outside the ivory tower. What is more, many of 
the constituencies that have been the focus of recent campaigns driven 
by identity politics, such as female executives in Silicon Valley and 
female Hollywood stars, are near the top of the income distribution. 
Helping them achieve greater equality is a good thing, but it will do 
little to address the glaring disparities between the top one percent of 
earners and everyone else.
Today’s left-wing identity politics also diverts attention from larger 
groups whose serious problems have been ignored. Until recently, 
activists on the left had little to say about the burgeoning opioid crisis or 
the fate of children growing up in impoverished single-parent families 
in the rural United States. And the Democrats have put forward no 
ambitious strategies to deal with the potentially immense job losses that 
will accompany advancing automation or the income disparities that 
technology may bring to all Americans.
Moreover, the left’s identity politics poses a threat to free speech and 
to the kind of rational discourse needed to sustain a democracy. Liberal 
democracies are committed to protecting the right to say virtually 
anything in a marketplace of ideas, particularly in the political sphere. 
But the preoccupation with identity has clashed with the need for civic 
discourse. The focus on lived experience by identity groups prioritizes 
the emotional world of the inner self over the rational examination of 
issues in the outside world and privileges sincerely held opinions over 
a process of reasoned deliberation that may force one to abandon prior 
opinions. The fact that an assertion is offensive to someone’s sense 
of self-worth is often seen as grounds for silencing or disparaging the 
individual who made it.
A reliance on identity politics also has weaknesses as a political 
strategy. The current dysfunction and decay of the U.S. political system 
are related to extreme and ever-growing polarization, which has made 
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routine governing an exercise in brinkmanship. Most of the blame for 
this belongs to the right. As the political scientists Thomas Mann and 
Norman Ornstein have argued, the Republican Party has moved much 
more rapidly toward its far-right wing than the Democratic Party has 
moved in the opposite direction. But both parties have moved away from 
the center. Left-wing activists focused on identity issues are seldom 
representative of the electorate as a whole; indeed, their concerns often 
alienate mainstream voters.
But perhaps the worst thing about identity politics as currently 
practiced by the left is that it has stimulated the rise of identity politics 
on the right. This is due in no small part to the left’s embrace of 
political correctness, a social norm that prohibits people from publicly 
expressing their beliefs or opinions without fearing moral opprobrium. 
Every society has certain views that run counter to its foundational 
ideas of legitimacy and therefore are off-limits in public discourse. But 
the constant discovery of new identities and the shifting grounds for 
acceptable speech are hard to follow. In a society highly attuned to group 
dignity, new boundaries lines keep appearing, and previously acceptable 
ways of talking or expressing oneself become offensive. Today, for 
example, merely using the words “he” or “she” in certain contexts might 
be interpreted as a sign of insensitivity to intersex or transgender people. 
But such utterances threaten no fundamental democratic principles; 
rather, they challenge the dignity of a particular group and denote a lack 
of awareness of or sympathy for that group’s struggles.
In reality, only a relatively small number of writers, artists, students, 
and intellectuals on the left espouse the most extreme forms of political 
correctness. But those instances are picked up by the conservative 
media, which use them to tar the left as a whole. This may explain 
one of the extraordinary aspects of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 
which was Trump’s popularity among a core group of supporters despite 
behavior that, in an earlier era, would have doomed a presidential bid. 
During the campaign, Trump mocked a journalist’s physical disabilities, 
characterized Mexicans as rapists and criminals, and was heard on a 
recording bragging that he had groped women. Those statements were 
less transgressions against political correctness than transgressions 
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against basic decency, and many of Trump’s supporters did not 
necessarily approve of them or of other outrageous comments that 
Trump made. But at a time when many Americans believe that public 
speech is excessively policed, Trump’s supporters like that he is not 
intimidated by the pressure to avoid giving offense. In an era shaped by 
political correctness, Trump represents a kind of authenticity that many 
Americans admire: he may be malicious, bigoted, and unpresidential, 
but at least he says what he thinks.
And yet Trump’s rise did not reflect a conservative rejection of 
identity politics; in fact, it reflected the right’s embrace of identity 
politics. Many of Trump’s white working-class supporters feel that they 
have been disregarded by elites. People living in rural areas, who are the 
backbone of populist movements not just in the United States but also in 
many European countries, often believe that their values are threatened 
by cosmopolitan, urban elites. And although they are members of a 
dominant ethnic group, many members of the white working class see 
themselves as victimized and marginalized. Such sentiments have paved 
the way for the emergence of a right-wing identity politics that, at its 
most extreme, takes the form of explicitly racist white nationalism.
Trump has directly contributed to this process. His transformation 
from real estate mogul and reality-television star to political contender 
took off after he became the most famous promoter of the racist “birther” 
conspiracy theory, which cast doubt on Barack Obama’s eligibility to 
serve as president. As a candidate, he was evasive when asked about 
the fact that the former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke had endorsed 
him, and he complained that a U.S. federal judge overseeing a lawsuit 
against Trump University was treating him “unfairly” because of the 
judge’s Mexican heritage. After a violent gathering of white nationalists 
in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017 – where a white nationalist 
killed a counterprotester – Trump averred that there were “very fine 
people on both sides.” And he has spent a lot of time singling out black 
athletes and celebrities for criticism and has been happy to exploit anger 
over the removal of statues honoring Confederate leaders.
Thanks to Trump, white nationalism has moved from the fringes to 
something resembling the mainstream. Its proponents complain that 
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although it is politically acceptable to talk about black rights, or women’s 
rights, or gay rights, it is not possible to advocate the rights of white 
Americans without being branded a racist. The practitioners of identity 
politics on the left would argue that the right’s assertions of identity are 
illegitimate and cannot be placed on the same moral plane as those of 
minorities, women, and other marginalized groups, since they reflect the 
perspective of a historically privileged community. That is clearly true. 
Conservatives greatly exaggerate the extent to which minority groups 
receive advantages, just as they exaggerate the extent to which political 
correctness muzzles free speech. The reality for many marginalized 
groups remains unchanged: African Americans continue to be subjected 
to police violence; women are still assaulted and harassed.
What is notable, however, is how the right has adopted language and 
framing from the left: the idea that whites are being victimized, that their 
situation and suffering are invisible to the rest of society, and that the 
social and political structures responsible for this situation – especially 
the media and the political establishment – need to be smashed. Across 
the ideological spectrum, identity politics is the lens through which most 
social issues are now seen.
A NEED FOR CREED
Societies need to protect marginalized and excluded groups, but they 
also need to achieve common goals through deliberation and consensus. 
The shift in the agendas of both the left and the right toward the protection 
of narrow group identities ultimately threatens that process. The remedy 
is not to abandon the idea of identity, which is central to the way that 
modern people think about themselves and their surrounding societies; 
it is to define larger and more integrative national identities that take into 
account the de facto diversity of liberal democratic societies.
Human societies cannot get away from identity or identity politics. 
Identity is a “powerful moral idea,” in the philosopher Charles Taylor’s 
phrase, built on the universal human characteristic of thymos. This 
moral idea tells people that they have authentic inner selves that are not 
being recognized and suggests that external society may be false and 
repressive. It focuses people’s natural demand for recognition of their 
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dignity and provides language for expressing the resentments that arise 
when such recognition is not forthcoming.
It would be neither possible nor desirable for such demands for dignity 
to disappear. Liberal democracy is built on the rights of individuals 
to enjoy an equal degree of choice and agency in determining their 
collective political lives. But many people are not satisfied with equal 
recognition as generic human beings. In some sense, this is a condition of 
modern life. Modernization means constant change and disruption and 
the opening up of choices that did not exist before. This is by and large 
a good thing: over generations, millions of people have fled traditional 
communities that did not offer them choices in favor of communities that 
did. But the freedom and degree of choice that exist in a modern liberal 
society can also leave people unhappy and disconnected from their 
fellow human beings. They find themselves nostalgic for the community 
and structured life they think they have lost, or that their ancestors 
supposedly possessed. The authentic identities they are seeking are ones 
that bind them to other people. People who feel this way can be seduced 
by leaders who tell them that they have been betrayed and disrespected 
by existing power structures and that they are members of important 
communities whose greatness will again be recognized.
The nature of modern identity, however, is to be changeable. Some 
individuals may persuade themselves that their identity is based on their 
biology and is outside their control. But citizens of modern societies have 
multiple identities, ones that are shaped by social interactions. People 
have identities defined by their race, gender, workplace, education, 
affinities, and nation. And although the logic of identity politics is to 
divide societies into small, self-regarding groups, it is also possible to 
create identities that are broader and more integrative. One does not have 
to deny the lived experiences of individuals to recognize that they can 
also share values and aspirations with much broader circles of citizens. 
Lived experience, in other words, can become just plain experience – 
something that connects individuals to people unlike themselves, rather 
than setting them apart. So although no democracy is immune from 
identity politics in the modern world, all of them can steer it back to 
broader forms of mutual respect.
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The first and most obvious place to start is by countering the specific 
abuses that lead to group victimhood and marginalization, such as 
police violence against minorities and sexual harassment. No critique 
of identity politics should imply that these are not real and urgent 
problems that require concrete solutions. But the United States and 
other liberal democracies have to go further than that. Governments 
and civil society groups must focus on integrating smaller groups into 
larger wholes. Democracies need to promote what political scientists 
call “creedal national identities,” which are built not around shared 
personal characteristics, lived experiences, historical ties, or religious 
convictions but rather around core values and beliefs. The idea is to 
encourage citizens to identify with their countries’ foundational ideals 
and use public policies to deliberately assimilate newcomers.
Combating the pernicious influence of identity politics will prove 
quite difficult in Europe. In recent decades, the European left has 
supported a form of multiculturalism that minimizes the importance of 
integrating newcomers into creedal national cultures. Under the banner 
of antiracism, left-wing European parties have downplayed evidence 
that multiculturalism has acted as an obstacle to assimilation. The new 
populist right in Europe, for its part, looks back nostalgically at fading 
national cultures that were based on ethnicity or religion and flourished 
in societies that were largely free of immigrants.
The fight against identity politics in Europe must start with changes 
to citizenship laws. Such an agenda is beyond the capability of the EU, 
whose 28 member states zealously defend their national prerogatives 
and stand ready to veto any significant reforms or changes. Any action 
that takes place will therefore have to happen, for better or worse, 
on the level of individual countries. To stop privileging some ethnic 
groups over others, EU member states with citizenship laws based on 
jus sanguinis – “the right of blood,” which confers citizenship according 
to the ethnicity of parents – should adopt new laws based on jus soli, 
“the right of the soil,” which confers citizenship on anyone born in 
the territory of the country. But European states should also impose 
stringent requirements on the naturalization of new citizens, something 
the United States has done for many years. In the United States, in 
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addition to having to prove continuous residency in the country for five 
years, new citizens are expected to be able to read, write, and speak basic 
English; have an understanding of U.S. history and government; be of 
good moral character (that is, have no criminal record); and demonstrate 
an attachment to the principles and ideals of the U.S. Constitution by 
swearing an oath of allegiance to the United States. European countries 
should expect the same from their new citizens.
In addition to changing the formal requirements for citizenship, 
European countries need to shift away from conceptions of national 
identity based on ethnicity. Nearly 20 years ago, a German academic 
of Syrian origin named Bassam Tibi proposed making Leitkultur 
(leading culture) the basis for a new German national identity. He 
defined Leitkultur as a belief in equality and democratic values 
firmly grounded in the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment. Yet leftist 
academics and politicians attacked his proposal for suggesting that such 
values were superior to other cultural values; in doing so, the German 
left gave unwitting comfort to Islamists and far-right nationalists, who 
have little use for Enlightenment ideals. But Germany and other major 
European countries desperately need something like Tibi’s Leitkultur: 
a normative change that would permit Germans of Turkish heritage to 
speak of themselves as German, Swedes of African heritage to speak of 
themselves as Swedish, and so on. This is beginning to happen, but too 
slowly. Europeans have created a remarkable civilization of which they 
should be proud, one that can encompass people from other cultures 
even as it remains aware of its own distinctiveness.
Compared with Europe, the United States has been far more 
welcoming of immigrants, in part because it developed a creedal 
national identity early in its history. As the political scientist Seymour 
Martin Lipset pointed out, a U.S. citizen can be accused of being “un-
American” in a way that a Danish citizen could not be described as 
being “un-Danish” or a Japanese citizen could not be charged with being 
“un-Japanese.” Americanism constitutes a set of beliefs and a way of 
life, not an ethnicity.
Today, the American creedal national identity, which emerged in the 
wake of the Civil War, must be revived and defended against attacks 
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from both the left and the right. On the right, white nationalists would 
like to replace the creedal national identity with one based on race, 
ethnicity, and religion. On the left, the champions of identity politics 
have sought to undermine the legitimacy of the American national story 
by emphasizing victimization, insinuating in some cases that racism, 
gender discrimination, and other forms of systematic exclusion are in 
the country’s DNA. Such flaws have been and continue to be features 
of American society, and they must be confronted. But progressives 
should also tell a different version of U.S. history, one focused on how 
an ever-broadening circle of people have overcome barriers to achieve 
recognition of their dignity.
Although the United States has benefited from diversity, it cannot 
build its national identity on diversity. A workable creedal national 
identity has to offer substantive ideas, such as constitutionalism, the rule 
of law, and human equality. Americans respect those ideas; the country 
is justified in withholding citizenship from those who reject them.
BACK TO BASICS
Once a country has defined a proper creedal national identity 
that is open to the de facto diversity of modern societies, the nature 
of controversies over immigration will inevitably change. In both the 
United States and Europe, that debate is currently polarized. The right 
seeks to cut off immigration altogether and would like to send immigrants 
back to their countries of origin; the left asserts a virtually unlimited 
obligation on the part of liberal democracies to accept all immigrants. 
These are both untenable positions. The real debate should instead be 
about the best strategies for assimilating immigrants into a country’s 
creedal national identity. Well-assimilated immigrants bring a healthy 
diversity to any society; poorly assimilated immigrants are a drag on the 
state and in some cases constitute security threats.
European governments pay lip service to the need for better 
assimilation but fail to follow through. Many European countries 
have put in place policies that actively impede integration. Under the 
Dutch system of “pillarization,” for example, children are educated in 
separate Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, and secular systems. Receiving 
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an education in a state-supported school without ever having to deal 
with people outside one’s own religion is not likely to foster rapid 
assimilation.
In France, the situation is somewhat different. The French concept of 
republican citizenship, like its U.S. counterpart, is creedal, built around 
the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. France’s 
1905 law on laïcité, or secularism, formally separates church and state 
and makes impossible the kinds of publicly funded religious schools 
that operate in the Netherlands. But France has other big problems. 
First, regardless of what French law says, widespread discrimination 
holds back the country’s immigrants. Second, the French economy has 
been underperforming for years, with unemployment rates that are twice 
those of neighboring Germany. For young immigrants in France, the 
unemployment rate is close to 35 percent, compared with 25 percent for 
French youth as a whole. France should help integrate its immigrants by 
making it easier for them to find jobs, primarily by liberalizing the labor 
market. Finally, the idea of French national identity and French culture 
has come under attack as Islamophobic; in contemporary France, the 
very concept of assimilation is not politically acceptable to many on the 
left. This is a shame, since it allows the nativists and extremists of the 
far-right National Front to position themselves as the true defenders of 
the republican ideal of universal citizenship.
In the United States, an assimilation agenda would begin with public 
education. The teaching of basic civics has been in decline for decades, 
not just for immigrants but also for native-born Americans. Public 
schools should also move away from the bilingual and multilingual 
programs that have become popular in recent decades. (New York City’s 
public school system offers instruction in more than a dozen different 
languages.) Such programs have been marketed as ways to speed the 
acquisition of English by nonnative speakers, but the empirical evidence 
on whether they work is mixed; indeed, they may in fact delay the 
process of learning English.
The American creedal national identity would also be strengthened 
by a universal requirement for national service, which would underline 
the idea that U.S. citizenship demands commitment and sacrifice. A 
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citizen could perform such service either by enlisting in the military or 
by working in a civilian role, such as teaching in schools or working 
on publicly funded environmental conservation projects similar to 
those created by the New Deal. If such national service were correctly 
structured, it would force young people to work together with others 
from very different social classes, regions, races, and ethnicities, just 
as military service does. And like all forms of shared sacrifice, it would 
integrate newcomers into the national culture. National service would 
serve as a contemporary form of classical republicanism, a form of 
democracy that encouraged virtue and public-spiritedness rather than 
simply leaving citizens alone to pursue their private lives.
ASSIMILATION NATION
In both the United States and Europe, a policy agenda focused on 
assimilation would have to tackle the issue of immigration levels. 
Assimilation into a dominant culture becomes much harder as the 
numbers of immigrants rise relative to the native population. As 
immigrant communities reach a certain scale, they tend to become self-
sufficient and no longer need connections to groups outside themselves. 
They can overwhelm public services and strain the capacity of schools 
and other public institutions to care for them. Immigrants will likely 
have a positive net effect on public finances in the long run – but only if 
they get jobs and become tax-paying citizens or lawful residents. Large 
numbers of newcomers can also weaken support among native-born 
citizens for generous welfare benefits, a factor in both the U.S. and the 
European immigration debates.
Liberal democracies benefit greatly from immigration, both 
economically and culturally. But they also unquestionably have the right 
to control their own borders. All people have a basic human right to 
citizenship. But that does not mean they have the right to citizenship 
in any particular country beyond the one in which they or their parents 
were born. International law does not, moreover, challenge the right of 
states to control their borders or to set criteria for citizenship.
The EU needs to be able to control its external borders better than 
it does, which in practice means giving countries such as Greece and 
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Italy more funding and stronger legal authority to regulate the flow 
of immigrants. The EU agency charged with doing this, Frontex, is 
understaffed and underfunded and lacks strong political support from the 
very member states most concerned with keeping immigrants out. The 
system of free internal movement within the EU will not be politically 
sustainable unless the problem of Europe’s external borders is solved.
In the United States, the chief problem is the inconsistent enforcement 
of immigration laws. Doing little to prevent millions of people from 
entering and staying in the country unlawfully and then engaging in 
sporadic and seemingly arbitrary bouts of deportation – which were a 
feature of Obama’s time in office – is hardly a sustainable long-term 
policy. But Trump’s pledge to “build a wall” on the Mexican border 
is little more than nativistic posturing: a huge proportion of illegal 
immigrants enter the United States legally and simply remain in the 
country after their visas expire. What is needed is a better system of 
sanctioning companies and people who hire illegal immigrants, which 
would require a national identification system that could help employers 
figure out who can legally work for them. Such a system has not been 
established because too many employers benefit from the cheap labor 
that illegal immigrants provide. Moreover, many on the left and the 
right oppose a national identification system owing to their suspicion of 
government overreach.
Compared with Europe, the United States has been far more 
welcoming of immigrants, in part because it developed a creedal national 
identity early in its history.
As a result, the United States now hosts a population of around 11 
million illegal immigrants. The vast majority of them have been in 
the country for years and are doing useful work, raising families, and 
otherwise behaving as law-abiding citizens. A small number of them 
commit criminal acts, just as a small number of native-born Americans 
commit crimes. But the idea that all illegal immigrants are criminals 
because they violated U.S. law to enter or stay in the country is ridiculous, 
just as it is ridiculous to think that the United States could ever force all 
of them to leave the country and return to their countries of origin.
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The outlines of a basic bargain on immigration reform have existed 
for some time. The federal government would undertake serious 
enforcement measures to control the country’s borders and would also 
create a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants without criminal 
records. Such a bargain might receive the support of a majority of U.S. 
voters, but hard-core immigration opponents are dead set against any 
form of “amnesty,” and pro-immigrant groups are opposed to stricter 
enforcement.
Public policies that focus on the successful assimilation of foreigners 
might help break this logjam by taking the wind out of the sails of the 
current populist upsurge in both the United States and Europe. The 
groups vociferously opposing immigration are coalitions of people with 
different concerns. Hard-core nativists are driven by racism and bigotry; 
little can be done to change their minds. But others have more legitimate 
concerns about the speed of social change driven by mass immigration 
and worry about the capacity of existing institutions to accommodate 
this change. A policy focus on assimilation might ease their concerns 
and peel them away from the bigots.
Identity politics thrives whenever the poor and the marginalized are 
invisible to their compatriots. Resentment over lost status starts with 
real economic distress, and one way of muting the resentment is to 
mitigate concerns over jobs, incomes, and security. In the United States, 
much of the left stopped thinking several decades ago about ambitious 
social policies that might help remedy the underlying conditions of the 
poor. It was easier to talk about respect and dignity than to come up 
with potentially costly plans that would concretely reduce inequality. A 
major exception to this trend was Obama, whose Affordable Care Act 
was a milestone in U.S. social policy. The ACA’s opponents tried to 
frame it as an identity issue, insinuating that the policy was designed by 
a black president to help his black constituents. But the ACA was in fact 
a national policy designed to help less well-off Americans regardless 
of their race or identity. Many of the law’s beneficiaries include rural 
whites in the South who have nonetheless been persuaded to vote for 
Republican politicians vowing to repeal the ACA.
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Identity politics has made the crafting of such ambitious policies 
more difficult. Although fights over economic policy produced sharp 
divisions early in the twentieth century, many democracies found that 
those with opposing economic visions could often split the difference 
and compromise. Identity issues, by contrast, are harder to reconcile: 
either you recognize me or you don’t. Resentment over lost dignity or 
invisibility often has economic roots, but fights over identity frequently 
distract from policy ideas that could help. As a result, it has been harder 
to create broad coalitions to fight for redistribution: members of the 
working class who also belong to higher-status identity groups (such as 
whites in the United States) tend to resist making common cause with 
those below them, and vice versa.
The Democratic Party, in particular, has a major choice to make. It can 
continue to try to win elections by doubling down on the mobilization of 
the identity groups that today supply its most fervent activists: African 
Americans, Hispanics, professional women, the LGBT community, and 
so on. Or the party could try to win back some of the white working-
class voters who constituted a critical part of Democratic coalitions 
from the New Deal through the Great Society but who have defected 
to the Republican Party in recent elections. The former strategy might 
allow it to win elections, but it is a poor formula for governing the 
country. The Republican Party is becoming the party of white people, 
and the Democratic Party is becoming the party of minorities. Should 
that process continue much further, identity will have fully displaced 
economic ideology as the central cleavage of U.S. politics, which would 
be an unhealthy outcome for American democracy.
A MORE UNIFIED FUTURE
Fears about the future are often best expressed through fiction, 
particularly science fiction that tries to imagine future worlds based on 
new kinds of technology. In the first half of the twentieth century, many 
of those forward-looking fears centered on big, centralized, bureaucratic 
tyrannies that snuffed out individuality and privacy: think of George 
Orwell’s 1984. But the nature of imagined dystopias began to change in 
the later decades of the century, and one particular strand spoke to the 
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anxieties raised by identity politics. So-called cyberpunk authors such 
as William Gibson, Neal Stephenson, and Bruce Sterling saw a future 
dominated not by centralized dictatorships but by uncontrolled social 
fragmentation facilitated by the Internet.
Stephenson’s 1992 novel, Snow Crash, posited a ubiquitous virtual 
“Metaverse” in which individuals could adopt avatars and change their 
identities at will. In the novel, the United States has broken down into 
“Burbclaves,” suburban subdivisions catering to narrow identities, such 
as New South Africa (for the racists, with their Confederate flags) and 
Mr. Lee’s Greater Hong Kong (for Chinese immigrants). Passports 
and visas are required to travel from one neighborhood to another. The 
CIA has been privatized, and the aircraft carrier the USS Enterprise 
has become a floating home for refugees. The authority of the federal 
government has shrunk to encompass only the land on which federal 
buildings are located.
Our present world is simultaneously moving toward the opposing 
dystopias of hypercentralization and endless fragmentation. China, for 
instance, is building a massive dictatorship in which the government 
collects highly specific personal data on the daily transactions of every 
citizen. On the other hand, other parts of the world are seeing the 
breakdown of centralized institutions, the emergence of failed states, 
increasing polarization, and a growing lack of consensus over common 
ends. Social media and the Internet have facilitated the emergence of 
self-contained communities, walled off not by physical barriers but by 
shared identities.
The good thing about dystopian fiction is that it almost never comes 
true. Imagining how current trends will play out in an ever more 
exaggerated fashion serves as a useful warning: 1984 became a potent 
symbol of a totalitarian future that people wanted to avoid; the book 
helped inoculate societies against authoritarianism. Likewise, people 
today can imagine their countries as better places that support increasing 
diversity yet that also embrace a vision for how diversity can serve 
common ends and support liberal democracy rather than undermine it.
People will never stop thinking about themselves and their societies 
in identity terms. But people’s identities are neither fixed nor necessarily 
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given by birth. Identity can be used to divide, but it can also be used to 
unify. That, in the end, will be the remedy for the populist politics of the 
present.
Published:
https://www.sas.upenn.edu/andrea-mitchell-center/francis-
fukuyama-against-identity-politics 
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ABOUT JEAN MONNET
Jean Monnet,
(born Nov. 9, 1888, Cognac, 
France – died March 16, 1979, 
Houjarray), French political 
economist and diplomat 
who initiated comprehensive 
economic planning in western 
Europe after World War II. In 
France he was responsible for 
the successful plan designed 
to rebuild and modernize that 
nation’s crumbled economy.
During World War I 
Monnet was the French 
representative on the Inter-
Allied Maritime Commission, 
and after the war he was deputy secretary-general of the League 
of Nations (1919-23). Then, after reorganizing his family’s brandy 
business, he became the European partner of a New York investment 
bank in 1925.
At the start of World War II he was made chairman of the Franco-
British Economic Co-ordination Committee. In June 1940 it was he 
who suggested a Franco-British union to Winston Churchill. After the 
Franco-German armistice he left for Washington, D.C., and in 1943 he 
was sent to Algiers to work with the Free French administration there.
After the liberation of France, Monnet headed a government 
committee to prepare a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction and 
modernization of the French economy. On Jan. 11, 1947, the Monnet 
Plan was adopted by the French government, and Monnet himself was 
appointed commissioner-general of the National Planning Board. In 
May 1950 he and Robert Schuman, then the French foreign minister, 
proposed the establishment of a common European market for coal and 
steel by countries willing to delegate their powers over these industries 
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to an independent authority. Six countries – France, West Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg – signed the treaty in 
1951 that set up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). From 
1952 to 1955 Monnet served as the first president of the ECSC’s High 
Authority. The ECSC inspired the creation of the European Economic 
Community, or Common Market, in 1957.
In 1955 Monnet organized the Action Committee for the United 
States of Europe and served as its president from 1956 to 1975. In 1976 
the heads of the nine Common Market governments named Monnet 
a Citizen of Europe. In the same year, he published his Mémoires 
(Memoirs, 1978).
Source: 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Monnet 
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ABOUT ERASMUS+  
JEAN MONNET PROGRAMME
Jean Monnet Programme has transformed into Jean Monnet Actions 
under ERASMUS+ Programme since 2014.
Within the Erasmus+ Programme, the Jean Monnet Activities aim at 
promoting excellence in teaching and research in the field of European 
Union studies worldwide. These activities also aim at fostering the 
dialogue between the academic world and policy-makers, in particular 
with the aim of enhancing governance of EU policies.
Key activities include courses, research, conferences, networking 
activities, and publications in the field of EU studies.
European Union studies comprise the study of Europe in its entirety 
with particular emphasis on the European integration process in both 
its internal and external aspects. The discipline also covers the role 
of the EU in a globalised world and in promoting an active European 
citizenship and dialogue between people and cultures.
Jean Monnet Activities supported are 3 types:
• Teaching and Research: Jean Monnet Modules, Chairs and Centres 
of Excellence.
• Support to Associations: Jean Monnet Associations.
• Policy Debate with the Academic World: Jean Monnet Networks 
and Jean Monnet Projects.
Jean Monnet Activities are described in details in the Programme 
Guide and Call is published at: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus-plus/
selection-results/jean-monnet-activities-2018_en
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The Erasmus+ Programme Guide includes Jean Monnet Actions 
Chapters: https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/resources/
programme-guide_en
Statistics for Ukraine’s participation in Jean Monnet until 2018 
are in Jean Monnet Project database: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/
JeanMonnetDirectory/#/search-screen/
Selection results at: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus-plus/
selection-results_en
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